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After more than ten years of a broad-ranging and extensive pro-
cess of financial liberalization and deregulation, the Latin Amer-
ican picture in the banking, insurance and pension fund markets
has been significantly changed by the massive presence of glob-
alized financial institutions. The major Spanish banks have been
among the main actors in this respect and have become leading
figures in most countries and business segments. From the Latin
American standpoint, the entry of foreign banks, especially
those of Spain, has helped to invigorate and modernize the fi-
nancial systems of the region; has brought in new instruments
and technologies; has increased competition, with direct effects
on access to credit and its cost, and has given the local financial
systems greater strength and stability. However, it has also given
rise to some difficulties, such as greater concentration and only a
very slow process of handing on to clients the benefits of the
greater competition and efficiency achieved in the Latin Ameri-
can financial markets. This extensive presence of Spanish banks,
together with the active expansion of Spanish non-financial
companies in the main Latin American markets, has revealed the
limitations of the local regulatory frameworks for coping with
the growing globalization of international markets. Thus, deci-
sions taken in Europe affect users in Latin America, causing re-
actions at various levels whose results will only become evident
in the future.
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I
Introduction
The profound changes undergone by the economies
of the region –openness, liberalization and deregula-
tion– have given rise to a new business environment
in Latin America which provides easier access for
foreign investors. In the 1990s, foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) flows to Latin America and the Caribbean
registered unprecedented growth rates, rising from
US$ 9.2 billion in 1990 to nearly US$ 86 billion in
1999 (ECLAC, 2000). This means that over 65% of
the present stock of FDI entered in the 1990s. In prac-
tice, then, foreign investments in the region have
been almost completely renewed. This phenomenon
has been marked by major changes in the origin, des-
tination and strategies of foreign investors (ECLAC,
2000; Calderón and Vodusek, 1998:
– Although foreign investors’ interest has contin-
ued to be centered on the biggest economies of
the region, they have shown gradually increas-
ing interest in the smaller countries.
– The generalized predominance of United States
companies is beginning to be offset by the mas-
sive arrival of European companies, mainly
from Spain, the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands and France.
– Investments in manufacturing activities have
been replaced by investments in services, espe-
cially telecommunications, retail trade, energy
and finance. This has given rise to a massive in-
flow of companies which are setting up opera-
tions in Latin America for the first time.
– Foreign investors have mostly resorted to the
purchase of existing assets to enter the region or
expand their presence in it, first through the ex-
tensive privatization programmes and later
through the acquisition of local private firms.
In this new setting, Spanish companies have
become leading actors. After having been almost
totally absent at the beginning of the 1990s, now,
at the end of the decade, Spain has become the sec-
ond largest investor in the region and the largest
investor of European origin (Calderón, 1999a). In
this period, the largest Spanish companies concen-
trated their expansion strategy on the services area
of Latin America, through the acquisition of exist-
ing assets, in order to cope with the challenges
posed by the creation of the Single Market and a
common currency in Europe (figure 1).
Major Spanish investments in Latin America
began in the early 1990s with the strong presence
of Telefónica and Iberia in the privatization pro-
cesses of the region; subsequently they were fur-
ther strengthened with the entry of Endesa España
and Repsol in the middle of the decade, and they
took on really large dimensions with the acquisi-
tion strategy implemented by banking institutions
from 1996 on (figure 1). In aggregate terms,
the financial sector (mainly banks and insurance)
has been the main direct Spanish investor abroad,
only exceeded recently by big investments of the
telecommunications and energy companies: the
participation of Telefónica de España in the pri-
vatization of the Telebras system in mid-1998 and
the assumption by Repsol and Endesa España of
the control and management of the biggest private
energy companies of Argentina and Chile
(Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) and
Enersis, respectively) early in 1999 (Calderón,
1999b).
The largest Spanish banks have invested
nearly US$ 10 billion in their Latin American ex-
pansion process. Thus, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
(BBV), Banco Santander and Banco Central His-
pano (BCH) –the last two of which recently
merged– saw a unique opportunity in the region to
attain dimensions that would allow them to com-
pete better in the demanding international financial
markets and thus maintain their identity, diversify
risks, and defend themselves against possible hos-
tile takeover bids by competitors.
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II
The changes in the Spanish banking system
In the mid-1970s the Spanish authorities began a
process of liberalization and deregulation of financial
activities. From 1985 on, the process of change in
the Spanish banking system speeded up with the in-
corporation of new technologies, products and con-
sumer habits, the increase in dis-intermediation, and
the entry of Spain into the European Union (EU).
Subsequently, the changes in the structure and strate-
gies of the financial institutions became still more
radical with the formation of the Single European
Market and the beginning of the process of economic
and monetary union in preparation for the entry into
use of the single currency, the Euro.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Spanish bank-
ing sector was content to satisfy the existing demand
for basic products in a context of limited competi-
tion. During the 1980s, however, the profound
changes which took place brought the market to the
verge of total saturation, there was a considerable in-
crease in competition, and the private banks were
obliged to redefine their strategies to satisfy the de-
mands and needs of their clients (persons, companies
and institutions). Thus, the system changed from a
product-oriented to a client-oriented banking system:
a process which has been typical of the financial in-
novation phenomenon worldwide (Casilda, Lamothe
and Monjas, 1997).
In this situation, the banks were mainly con-
cerned with maintaining their levels of profitability,
to which end they made significant cuts in their oper-
ating costs. They reduced the number of banking in-
stitutions (concentration increased through mergers),
they made staff cuts, and they reduced the number of
branches in their local networks. At the end of the
1980s, competition in the Spanish banking system
began to become really marked, with consequent dif-
ferences in the strategies adopted by the different in-
stitutions. This process was heightened when the
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FIGURE 1
Spain: Evolution of direct investments abroad, 1980-1998
(Millions of dollars)
Latin America and the Caribbean                     Total, worldwide
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Business Strategies and Investments Unit of the Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of data from the Dirección General de Economía Internacional y Transacciones Exteriores (DGEITE) of the
Ministry of the Economy and Finance of Spain.
Banco Santander brought out a high-yield current ac-
count called “SuperCuenta”:1 an initiative which was
quickly copied by the other banks.
The establishment of the Single European Mar-
ket meant the elimination of barriers to the free cir-
culation of capital among the member countries of
the European Union, as well as freedom to establish
and provide banking services. Thus, the financial
sector in both Spain and the rest of the European Un-
ion began to develop new growth and concentration
strategies in order to adapt to this new competitive
environment. On 1 January 1993, with the entry into
force of a set of directives drafted by the European
Council on the free circulation of capital and the cre-
ation of Community-wide financial institutions
through a single banking licence, formal European
Union regulations came into effect for the credit in-
stitutions market. On 14 July 1995, by Royal Decree,
the Spanish Government incorporated these Commu-
nity regulations into the national financial legislation.
Important multilateral commitments have also
been entered into with regard to financial services,
and these have speeded up changes in the strategies
of the main institutions and national markets, at both
the regional and world level. In December 1997 the
negotiations (also known as the Fifth Protocol) on fi-
nancial services were completed in the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
The banking market has begun to move from a
form of competition based on geographical proxim-
ity and the provision of free services to another more
generalized form marked by aggressive competition
in price policies and the supply of products and ser-
vices (Casilda, 1997). We thus see that the single
currency situation has obliged banking institutions
either to achieve the necessary economies of scale
(size) or to offer competitive advantages in a particu-
lar segment of the market (specialization).
Since the end of the 1980s, the large banks have
followed a growth strategy based on mergers and ac-
quisitions, for two reasons: to strengthen their market
presence (first at the national level and later interna-
tionally) and to increase their competitiveness. In
1988 the Banco de Bilbao and the Banco de Vizcaya
merged to form the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV),
and this was followed in 1991 by the fusion of the
Banco Central with the Banco Hispano to form the
Banco Central Hispano (BCH) and the establishment
of the Spanish Banking Corporation (Argentaria);2 in
1994 the Banco Santander took control of the Banco
Español de Crédito (Banesto), and in 1998 the Banco
Exterior de España (BEX), the Caja Postal and the
Banco Hipotecario merged with Argentaria. At the
beginning of 1999 the Banco Santander and the BCH
merged to form one of the largest banking institu-
tions in Europe, the Banco Santander Central His-
pano (BSCH), and in October of the same year the
BBV and Argentaria merged to form the second larg-
est Spanish bank, the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (BBVA).
This process has brought the Spanish banking
market to an increasingly high level of concentration
which is now one of the highest in Europe. The mar-
ket share of the five largest banks grew from 33% in
1987 to 50% in 1996. In the latter year, the corre-
sponding levels of concentration were 41% in
France, 35% in Italy, 28% in the United Kingdom
and 25% in Germany (Casilda, Lamothe and Monjas,
1997). At the end of 1999, the two largest Spanish
institutions (BSCH and BBVA) had 37% and 30% re-
spectively of the credit and deposits market
(Expansión, 1999a). Parallel with this process, as ex-
pected, there was an increase in both efficiency and
competition (basically as a result of the ongoing de-
cline in intermediation spreads), which furthered
modernization, innovation and improved service to
clients.
At the same time, this policy of mergers and ac-
quisitions allowed the large banks to attain a suitable
size for embarking on a strategy of internationaliza-
tion. In the case of Spain, this process has been cen-
tered on Portugal, France, Italy, Morocco and
especially Latin America. Likewise, and in parallel,
there has been an increase in the signing of coopera-
tion agreements between institutions of different
Community member countries in order to defend
themselves against the competition of the great
banks which have been growing up as truly Euro-
pean-scale institutions. Thus, some of the biggest
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1 The SuperCuenta was the first current account to pay interest
on the balance, and it allowed the Banco Santander to increase
its market share by 50%. This product was followed by others,
such as SuperDepósitos and SuperHipotecas, which forced the
main Spanish banks to engage in a new round of competition,
both in products and in market shares.
2 Argentaria grouped together the entire public banking system.
Its privatization was fully completed in 1998.
Spanish banks have sought to extend their presence
to other markets through alliances and the purchase
of minority shares in other European institutions.
In this respect, the BBV acquired 10% of the
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), 3.8% of the
French bank Crédit Lyonnais, and a securities com-
pany in Portugal (Midas); the Banco Santander
bought nearly 5% of the Italian institution San
Paolo-IMI and 10% of the Royal Bank of Scotland;
the BCH had minor shares in Commerzbank (3%)
and Société Générale (1.2%) and, until its merger
with the Banco Santander, a strategic alliance with
the Banco Comercial Português (BCP); and
Argentaria had a strategic alliance with the
Franco-Belgian group Dexia. Furthermore, at the end
of 1999 the BSCH and the Portuguese group
Champalimaud were negotiating a strategic alliance
and the new Spanish institution increased its share in
Société Générale to 3.3% and in San Paolo-IMI to
6.9% (figure 2). Early in 2000 there was speculation
about a strategic alliance between the BBVA and the
third largest Italian institution UniCredito Italiano. If
this operation were to be completed successfully, it
would form the biggest European trans-border alli-
ance (The Economist, 1999; Expansión, 1999b).
In the increasingly competitive context resulting
from both economic and financial globalization in
general and the establishment of the Single Market
and single currency in Europe, however, it is ex-
tremely likely that the pressures on the Spanish
banking system will increase. Indeed, there has been
an increase in the participation of foreign investors in
the main Spanish banking institutions. In this situa-
tion, it could happen that the local banking institu-
tions might also begin to acquire more and more
shares in foreign banks, even to the point of outright
purchase or mergers.
In view of these trends, many analysts thought it
likely that great European banks with a generalized
presence in the markets of the main Community
countries would arise. So far, however, this process
has not taken place as strongly as expected. In the
case of Spain, the foreign banks have not managed to
seriously challenge local institutions for leadership
of the market, even though there are no major restric-
tions affecting them in this respect. The network of
branches of the Spanish banks is a difficult barrier
for new entrants to overcome, since they must make
heavy investments in order to gain access to their po-
tential clients. In fact, foreign banks have not secured
significant market shares in any European Union
country. Likewise, no bank of a Community country
occupies a leading position anywhere except in its
country of origin. Consequently, for the Spanish
banks and for most of the other European institutions
in their countries of origin, physical proximity to
their clients continues to be a clear competitive ad-
vantage. It is precisely this feature which justifies the
concern over possible hostile takeovers of Spanish
banks by their European competitors, since this strat-
egy would give the latter easy access to a leading po-
sition in the Spanish banking market.
The launching of the Euro on 1 January 1999
has speeded up changes and reduced time horizons,
thus changing the expansion strategies of the main
European banks. In a first phase, it is expected that in
the next five years mergers will be mainly between
banks of the same nationality, since cross-border
mergers are more complicated on account of differ-
ences of language, culture and tax and regulatory
systems. Thus, the leading European banks will try
to strengthen their position in their local markets
–seeking a minimum critical size– in order to face
the continent-wide challenge later. During 1999, af-
THE SPANISH BANKS’ STRATEGIES IN LATIN AMERICA • ALVARO CALDERÓN AND RAMÓN CASILDA
C E P A L R E V I E W 7 0 • A P R I L 2 0 0 0 77
FIGURE 2
Relations of ownership between
banking institutions of Spain, France,





Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Cinco Días: Diario
de Economía y Empresa, Comisión Nacional de Mercado de
Valores, and the Madrid stock exchange.
a BBVA: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria; BSCH: Banco
Santander Central Hispano; BCP: Banco Comercial Português,
and BNL: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.
ter the formal appearance of the single currency, var-
ious large mergers and acquisitions have been
announced in a number of countries of the Commu-
nity (Spain, France, Italy and Germany) for a total
of over US$ 120 billion.3 If successful, each of these
offers would create large national banks that would
be in a strong position to compete for leadership in
Europe.
III
The internationalization of the Spanish banks:
the Latin American option
At the beginning of the 1990s, the banks of the in-
dustrialized countries had capital surpluses and were
under very strong pressure to reduce costs and take
measures to cope with the narrowing of profit mar-
gins in their markets –most of them mature and with
little capacity for growth–, so that an interesting pro-
cess of international expansion began to heat up still
further (Calderón and Casilda, 1999). The big Span-
ish institutions went beyond national borders in
search of continental- and world-scale markets, both
in order to maintain and strengthen their competitive
position and in order to defend themselves against
possible hostile takeover bids by local or external
competitors. In a first stage there was an increase in
alliances and collaboration agreements with other in-
stitutions, mostly from the Community. In a second
stage a rapid and aggressive strategy of expansion
into the main Latin American markets was put into
effect. The big Spanish banks saw in Latin America
the means of consolidating their active international-
ization process, based on four main criteria:
i) the search for greater size and competitive-
ness;
ii) entry into expanding markets, with a conse-
quent shift out of mature markets (as the Spanish
market was beginning to be);
iii) exploitation to the full of organizational and
technological resources and capabilities; and
iv) suitable diversification of risks as a function
of profitability.
In this sense, the Latin American countries of-
fered a unique opportunity, as the closest options,
such as those of other European countries, had ma-
ture markets and the possibilities for the acquisition
of banks in them were very limited and expensive.
Generally speaking, the financial systems of the
main Latin American countries were marked by con-
siderable openness and deregulation. Thus, the low
level of development of banking in the region, the
broad intermediation spreads, the high potential lev-
els of profitability and the improvements made in
bank supervision and regulation systems began to
open up interesting opportunities for new business.
At the same time, there was a clear lack of capital
and of new products to satisfy a growing demand for
financial services. For their part, the banks and eco-
nomic authorities of Latin America took a positive
view of the arrival of foreign partners, as a means of
overcoming the shortage of finance and thus
strengthening and modernizing the local financial
systems. All this was heightened by the context of a
common language, culture and history, whose ab-
sence was a limiting factor in other situations but
whose presence in this case favoured the transfer not
only of capital but also of technology and manage-
ment know-how.
In this state of affairs, the Spanish banks secured
a rapid and extensive presence in the main econo-
mies of the region, leading the way in the increasing
penetration of the Latin American financial systems
by foreign banks. Between 1996 and 1998 the share
of foreign banks in total deposits rose from 16% to
30% (Salomon Smith Barney, 1998). Nearly 60% of
loans and 50% of the total worth of the banking sys-
tems of the seven biggest economies of the region
are controlled to some extent by foreign institutions
(Salomon Smith Barney, 1999). Only three such in-
stitutions (BBVA, BSCH and Citicorp), however, are
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3 In Spain mergers took place between Banco Santander and
BCH and between BBV and Argentaria; in France a new insti-
tution was formed by the merger of the Banque Nationale de
Paris (BNP) with Société Générale and Paribas; and in Italy
there were offers by UniCredito Italiano SpA for Banca
Commerciale Italiana and by San Paolo-IMI for Banca di Roma
SpA. In Germany there were increasingly strong rumours of a
possible merger between the Dresdner Bank AG and the
Bayerische Hypotheken-und-Vereinsbank AG.
present in all of them4 (Durán, 1999). In recent
months, despite the international financial crisis and
its effects on Brazil and the other economies of the
region, foreign financial institutions have continued
to invest in Latin America. At present, the biggest
Spanish institutions own almost one-third of the as-
sets of the 20 biggest foreign banks (ECLAC, 2000),
which means that they alone exceed the share of the
United States banks, which have historically been the
leaders in this sector in the region (table 1).
In Latin America, rather than playing their tradi-
tional role of accompanying non-financial enter-
prises in their internationalization process by provid-
ing them with finance and financial services, what
the Spanish banks have done is to carry out an ex-
pansion strategy within their main area of activity
–commercial banking– by trying to achieve a pres-
ence in the largest possible number of markets. With
this aim in view, but using different strategies, the
main Spanish institutions (BBV, Santander, BCH)
have invested some US$ 10 billion in the region
(Calderón and Casilda, 1999). At the same time, the
main Spanish institutions have carried out an active
plan for diversification and the search for new busi-
ness in the Latin America. Among the types of new
business they have engaged in are investment bank-
ing, insurance and in particular participation in pen-
sion fund management. In addition, as in Spain, they
have acquired minority shares in some non-financial
enterprises, basically in sectors where other Spanish
investors are very active (telecommunications and
energy).
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TABLE 1
Latin America: Importance of foreign banks in selected countries, 1998
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
% foreign ownership Main foreign banks
of assets
Total assets Participation Effective Spanish (% of Othersin equity a control b total foreign banks)c
Argentina 160 363 43.2 51.5 BSCH and BBVA Bank Boston, Hong Kong and
(39%) Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC), Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro, Bank of America, Bank
of Nova Scotia, Chase,
Citibanik, ABN Amro,
Deutsche Bank
Brazil d 627 395 19.2 21.4 BSCH and BBVA ABN Amro, HSBC, Bank Boston,
(6%) Citibank, Crédit Commercial de
France, Sudameris, Lloyds Bank
Chile 108 546 39.4 35.9 BSCH and BBVA Bank of Nova Scotia, Citibank,
(46%) Bank Boston, ABN Amro
Colombia 30 945 21.5 28.8 BBVA and BSCH Citibank, Banque Sudameris
(59%)
Mexico 117 160 19.0 16.0 BSCH and BBVA Bank of Montreal, HSBC,
(33%) Citibank, JP Morgan,
Bank of Nova Scotia
Peru 22 074 39.8 58.5 BSCH and BBVA Banque Sudameris, Citibank,
(38%)
Venezuela 22 430 32.4 40.2 BBVA and BSCH Bank of Nova Scotia, Citibank,
(34%)
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from Salomon Smith Barney, 1998 and 1999.
a Refers to share of foreign banks in the assets of local institutions.
b Refers to share in the management of local banking institutions of foreign origin (40% or more of equity owned by a foreign bank).
c Total assets of banks with Spanish participation, as a share of total assets of all local banks with foreign participation.
d In Brazil, the State banks continue to be very important. This situation should change in the next few years, however, with the privatiza-
tion of some of the large State banks.
4 It should be noted that the main foreign banks in Latin Amer-
ica are not those with the broadest international presence.
Twelve out of the 20 leading banks in the region occupy rank-
ings below 50 at the international level (The Banker, 1999). Al-
most two-thirds (65.3%) of the total value of the assets of these
20 banks correspond to European Union countries, while United
States banks have a smaller share (29.7%). Participation by for-
eign banks is most concentrated in the Southern Cone countries
and least so in Mexico (ECLAC, 2000).
1. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria: Can Latin
America be a means for seeking a leading
position in the Europe of the Euro?
At the end of 1998 the BBV, which is both a bank and
an economic group, was one of the most important
financial institutions in Europe. As a bank, it was the
leader in terms of both assets and profits, while as a
financial group it was second in size and first in re-
sults (BBV, 1999a). At that time the BBV had 17% of
the Spanish market in terms of assets. Early in 1995,
it decided to carry out a thorough reorientation of its
international strategy, giving a decided boost to its
expansion abroad. Now, although 52% of its activi-
ties are in Spain, the BBV Group is present in 35
countries, especially in Latin America. The interna-
tionalization process has been quite rapid, and the
Latin American region has been given growing im-
portance in it. In 1998 Latin America accounted for
25% of the group’s total assets, 40% of its branches,
and 63% of its total number of jobs, contrasting with
only minimal activity four years before.
The BBV’s strategy has been to gradually gain
management control of the institutions incorporated
into it, without insisting on having a majority share
of the equity. It has also tended to give priority to
consensus and shared management with its local
partners (Burns and Weeks, 1998). A central element
in the strategy of this Spanish institution has been to
position itself at the head of each of the markets, seg-
ments and lines of business in which it competes
(BBV, 1999a). To this end, it has acted on two fronts:
on the one hand, through the overall growth and de-
velopment of existing activities, and on the other,
through a policy of acquisitions which has allowed it
to speed up its growth rate in those markets where it
has deemed it necessary to make special efforts.
Over the last four years the BBV has expanded
all over Latin America. It has made investments in
new markets by buying shares in local banks, has
strengthened its position in markets where it was al-
ready present, and it has increased its controlling
shares in various local institutions. In 1995 it took
over the management of banks in Mexico and Peru, a
year later in Colombia and Argentina, then in Vene-
zuela, and in 1998 in Brazil and Chile (table 2). It
has also developed a unified model for the manage-
ment of different institutions, adapted to the special
features of each financial system and each country.
During 1998 the BBV practically put the finish-
ing touches to its positioning phase in Latin Amer-
ica, where it now has a sound and significant pres-
ence in the main regional markets. In general, it has
invested in leading banks which guarantee minimum
profit levels of over 20% (Uriarte, 1997), whose
market shares in their respective countries are over
6%, and whose solvency is sufficiently ample (BBV,
1999a). In 1999 the BBV’s profits increased by 25%
to US$ 1.2 billion, of which US$ 274 million came
from its operations in the region (an increase of over
70% compared with 1997).
At the end of 1998 the BBV Group’s total assets
exceeded US$ 157 billion –twice the gross domestic
product of Chile and nearly half that of Argentina–
representing an increase of 5.5% over the previous
year. This increase was due basically to the incorpo-
ration of new acquisitions in Brazil and Chile and
expansion in Puerto Rico, which together repre-
sented a contribution of US$ 11.3 billion. These ac-
quisitions meant an increase of over 21% in total
assets in the region, which come to over US$ 43,026
million. However, the evolution of the local currency
values of its assets abroad, especially in Latin Amer-
ica, meant a decline of US$ 6.34 billion in the total
assets of the Group (BBV, 1999a).
According to BBV authorities, the Group has not
yet reached a fully satisfactory market share in Brazil
and Chile. This is due to the fact that it only began to
operate in those countries in recent years and to the
special features of those markets: the large size of
the Brazilian market and the heavy competition on
the domestic market in Chile. Depending on the op-
portunities that arise, BBV will probably make further
investments in these two important Latin American
markets: indeed, this Spanish group has the capacity
to increase its investment in Latin America from
US$ 1 billion to US$ 1.5 billion in the next two or
three years. The group’s entry into Mexico, for its
part, has become one of the BBV’s most successful
ventures, in spite of the difficulties through which
the local financial market is passing. The BBV Group
has invested some US$ 700 million in capital, infra-
structure, technological development and staff train-
ing in that country, and has become one of the most
solvent institutions in the area (Hernández, 1999).
One of the most important objectives of the
BBV’s strategy has been to increase its value on the
stock exchange. In this respect, the value of its stock
has increased more than the average for its main do-
mestic and European competitors, despite the diffi-
cult international conditions. This situation has been
reflected in the ongoing positive evaluation of this
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Spanish group by international risk assessment agen-
cies. In Latin America, there has not been any reduc-
tion in its profit levels in spite of the deterioration in
macroeconomic conditions. This is basically because
growth of the credit portfolio has been frozen and ef-
forts have been concentrated on ways of obtaining
resources from low-cost clients. In other words, there
has been greater caution about credit risks and their
coverage. There has thus been a big change in the
structure of deposits in the BBV’s Latin American op-
erations, while strong expansion towards the pension
fund management business has continued.
The BBV has a leading position in Spain as re-
gards the management of such funds: its market
share is over 14% and it manages assets worth some
US$ 5.3 billion for 467,000 clients (BBV, 1999a). In
Latin America, this Spanish bank has found an inter-
esting alternative for diversification and expansion in
this activity, because of its great growth potential in
the various markets of the region. At the end of
1998, the BBV was the second largest pension fund
administrator in the region, with a weighted market
share of 25% in the countries where it operates
and a leading position in Argentina, Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Mexico, Peru and El Salvador, managing
some US$ 4,570 million through six pension fund
management companies with 4.6 million members.
On 13 May 1999 the BBV further strengthened
and consolidated its leading position in Latin Amer-
ica through the indirect purchase of 40.74% of the
largest pension fund management company in Chile,
Provida.5 It thus began activities in Chile and Ecua-
dor and strengthened its position in Mexico, Colom-
bia, Peru and El Salvador (table 3). This operation,
valued at some US$ 266 million, was effected
through an exchange of stock between the Chilean
group Corp Group Pensions and the BBV. When it
was completed, it trebled the assets managed by the
BBV in Latin America to US$ 15.4 billion, with a cli-
ent base of over 8 million persons, and made the BBV
the most important pension fund management com-
pany in the region, with a weighted market share of
26% in terms of the assets managed (BBV, 1999b). In
October 1999, its share increased still further to 31%
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TABLE 2
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria group: a
Presence in the Latin American banking market, 1999
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
Position in Total value
Local bank % ownership local banking of assets, Year of entry Purchase
system December 1998 price
Argentina BBV Banco Francés 60 3 8 859 1996 980
Corp Banca Argentina 100 20 400 1999 85
Brazil Banco Excel-Económico
(now BBV Brasil) 100 14 5 000 1998 857
Chile Banco Hipotecario de
Fomento (BHIF), now
BBV Banco BHIF 55 6 2 960 1998 218
Colombia Banco Ganadero 63 2 3 526 1996 619
Mexico BBV México (ex-Probursa) 67 5 8 556 1995 365
Peru Banco Continental 39 3 2 864 1995 156
Puerto Rico BBV Puerto Rico 100 3 3 580 ... ...
Uruguay Banco Francés 58 ... ... 1995 ...
Venezuela Banco Provincial 51 1 4 186 1997 432
Total 43 026 4 500
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information published in BBV (1999a) and in the financial press.
a Argentaria has had a certain presence in Latin America, mainly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay, with the aim of boosting and
financing trade between Spain and MERCOSUR.
5 Provida has 2.4 million members, manages assets worth US$
10.2 billion, and has five foreign branches (Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru and El Salvador). In Chile, Provida accounts for
40% of the members of the pension system.
as a result of the merger with Argentaria. According
to the BBV’s estimates, it spent some US$ 875 mil-
lion in order to become the leading pension fund
management company.
In addition, as in its market of origin, the BBV
has looked for opportunities to invest in the stock of
companies not related with the financial area, in
which it remains a passive investor. Thus, it is esti-
mated that in the next few years it could invest some
US$ 3.5 billion in emerging Latin American sectors
such as telecommunications, energy and other ser-
vices. At present, it has acquired some stock in Latin
American companies in conjunction with companies
in which it already has an interest, such as Iberdrola,
Telefónica de España and Repsol. Particularly wor-
thy of note is the BBV’s participation in the consor-
tium led by Telefónica which has acquired the São
Paulo telephone company (Telesp) for US$ 4,961
million.
To sum up, within a short space of time the BBVA
has succeeded in establishing a solid leading position
in several of the main lines of business of the Latin
American financial sector (commercial banking and
pension fund management). Thus, from being a re-
gion where it had almost no presence, Latin America
has become a natural extension of the main activities
of this Spanish financial group, where it has repeated
its corporate strategy and its rivalry with its main
competitor in the Spanish market: the Banco
Santander. Indeed, even before their merger the BBV
and Argentaria had been rising in the scale of posi-
tions among the biggest banks in the world: between
1997 and 1998 the BBV rose from 50th to 47th place,
while Argentaria rose from 72nd to 67th (The Banker,
1999). Moreover, some analysts consider that once it
has consolidated its position in Latin America it may
begin to redirect its expansion strategy towards the
strengthening of its position in Europe. At the end of
1998 the BBV gained control of the fifth largest Ital-
ian banking group, the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
(BNL), for US$ 500 million, and in May 1999 it was
selected by the French authorities to form part of the
hard core of the Crédit Lyonnais, controlling 3.8% of
the equity (figure 2). In early 2000 it is also said to
be on the point of securing an alliance –and possible
merger– with one of the biggest Italian groups,
UniCredito Italiano. Thus, the merger of BBV and
Argentaria does not appear to represent any impedi-
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TABLE 3
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria group:
Presence in pension fund management in Latin America, 1999
Position in Total value of Number ofLocal company % ownership assets managedlocal market (millions of dollars) members
Argentina Consolidar 100 2 2 213 1 297 000
Bolivia Previsión 72 1 937 250 000
Chile Provida 47 1 10 200 2 400 000
Colombia Horizonte 70 2 486 461 000
Porvenir a 20 1 586 841 000
Ecuador Génesis a 25 1 15 87 000
El Salvador Previsión 51 2 7 134 000
Porvenir a 35 1 23 101 800
Mexico Profuturo 40 3 514 1 930 000
Peru Horizonte a 75 2 416 511 000
Total, BBV 15 397 8 012 000
Argentina Siembra 50 1 2 260 2 500 000
Bolivia Futuro ... ... ... ...
Colombia ... ... ... ... ...
El Salvador Máxima 50 ... ... ...
Panama ... ... ... ... ...
Total Argentaria 4 400 3 500 000
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of BBV (1999a); AFP Provida (http://www.afpprovida.cl), and Fundación Argentaria (1999).
a Indirect participation through AFP Provida.
ment to its expansion in the southern Euro zone
countries and could even further it.
2. The Banco Santander and the Banco Central
Hispano: two rivals with different business
strategies which ended up merging with
each other
At the end of 1998, the Banco Santander had 14% of
the Spanish market and was the second largest finan-
cial group in Spain. The Grupo Santander is widely
represented internationally, with nearly 5,800 offices
in 32 countries, serving some 17 million clients. Of
the present large Spanish banks, the Banco Santander
is that which has carried on its international expan-
sion strategy for the longest time, displaying a
marked capacity for innovation and flexibility (Burns
and Weeks, 1998) as well as a clear desire to gain
control in its overseas operations. In this respect, the
extensive international experience and strong leader-
ship exerted by the president of this bank, Emilio
Botín, has caused the Banco Santander to prefer to
act on its own –without local partners– in its Latin
American operations.
Its presence in Latin America goes back to the
early 1950s, after which it grew at a modest rate and
concentrated on the Southern Cone countries, espe-
cially Chile. From 1996 on, however, it embarked on
an active strategy of expansion through the acquisi-
tion of a large number of banks all over the region.
At the beginning of 1996, its operations in the region
generated only 8% of the total operating profits of
the Grupo Santander, but by the end of 1998 this
proportion had risen to over 40%. In 1998 Latin
America accounted for 27% of its assets, 30% of its
branches and 53% of its employees.
The year 1997 was particularly important for the
expansion strategy of the Grupo Santander in Latin
America, because in that year it incorporated banks
in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Vene-
zuela into its activities in the region (table 4). This
first phase of the Banco Santander’s expansion strat-
egy involved the acquisition of half a dozen banks in
five countries in a little over a year, for an outlay of
over US$ 3.5 billion. According to some analysts,
this acquisition strategy was determined to some ex-
tent by the likewise rapid expansion of the BBV in the
region. The Grupo Santander was concerned about
the fact that the most interesting assets were being
snapped up by its competitors –especially the BBV–
thus limiting the available opportunities and driving
up prices, so it speeded up its purchase strategy.
In 1998 there were two events which marked the
culmination of the first phase of its Latin American
expansion strategy: the sale of the 8.8% share that
the Banco Santander had in the United States bank
First Union Corp.6 and the purchase of the Banco do
Noroeste in Brazil. The Spanish group used US$ 1.5
billion of the added value generated by the
first-named transaction, plus US$ 300 million of its
profits from the preceding year, to finance its invest-
ments in Latin America. With these acquisitions, the
Grupo Santander now carries on banking activities in
nine countries of the region (table 4): Chile, Puerto
Rico, Peru and Uruguay, plus the five countries men-
tioned in the previous paragraph. Thus, according to
executives of the Group, the programme of acquisi-
tions in Latin America is now practically over, and
no further major purchase is now envisaged in the
short term, although this does not rule out small ac-
quisitions in the financial services industry, in order
to increase the Group’s capacity in the area of insur-
ance and pension funds or to add further branches to
the existing network.
This strategy has also been the subject of criti-
cism, however. Increasing the Group’s Latin Ameri-
can subsidiaries from three to nine in a little over one
year caused some concern among shareholders. On
the one hand it increased the Banco Santander’s ex-
posure in an area of higher risk, and on the other it
made the management of the Group more complex.
However, the executives of the bank have consis-
tently defended the strategy adopted in Latin Amer-
ica and have justified the policy of acquisitions,
maintaining that after analysing a large number of
banks in the region they selected the best.
The Banco Santander has tried to secure a strong
and homogeneous presence in the region. This objec-
tive has gradually been achieved, and it only remains
for the Group to improve its position in the markets
of Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Mexico. According to
some analysts, the Banco Santander’s operations in
those countries are too small to generate a critical
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6 In 1991 the Banco Santander had purchased 13.3% of First Fi-
delity Bancorporation, a small New Jersey bank without a na-
tionwide presence, for US$ 650 million. In June 1995, First
Fidelity merged with First Union, and the Banco Santander be-
came the biggest individual shareholder in First Union. In June
1997, the Santander Group sold its share for US$ 2,160 million.
mass of income (Falcão Filho, 1997). In Brazil, at
least in the short term, the Group will have to grow
without making acquisitions until such time as there
is a major restructuring of the Brazilian banking sys-
tem. In Mexico –the other great market of the re-
gion– the Banco Santander has had some problems
associated with the local banking crisis. Now, how-
ever, after an injection of capital from Head Office,
the Mexican subsidiary is one of the soundest institu-
tions in that country and is getting ready to increase
its share of the market as from the year 2000
(Hernández, 1999).
The Banco Santander’s strategy has always been
to secure majority control of the institutions ac-
quired. It thus has an average share of over 78% of
the equity of its acquisitions in Latin America
(Grupo Santander, 1999a). Furthermore, by agree-
ment with its shareholders, the institutions acquired
in Latin America must have a level of profits of at
least 20%. According to the Grupo Santander’s own
forecasts, however, the profit margins of its Latin
American branches are likely to go down signifi-
cantly as competition increases in the markets of the
region. Even so, the Group hopes to increase its in-
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TABLE 4
Santander Central Hispano group:
Presence in the Latin American banking market, 1999
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
Total value
Local bank % ownership Position in of assets, Year of Purchaselocal system December entry price
1998
Banco Santander
Argentina Banco Río de la Plata 51 2 9 175 1997 807
Brazil Banco Santander Brasil (formerly
Banco Geral do Comercio) 100 11 ... 1997 389
Banco Noroeste a 76 9 9 357 1998 564
Chile Banco Santander Chile 86 2 9 709 1996 718
Colombia Banco Santander Colombia 60 6 2 086 1997 236
Mexico Banco Santander Mexicano 71 5 9 808 1996 500
Peru Banco Santander Perú 100 6 951 1995 90
Puerto Rico Banco Santander Puerto Rico 78 2 6 468 1996 366
Uruguay Banco Santander Uruguay 100 3 740 ... ...
Venezuela Banco de Venezuela 98 3 2 008 1997 380
Total 50 302 4 000
Banco Central Hispano
Argentina Banco Tornquist b 100 16 1 165 1996 93
Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires 10 1 14 100 1998
Bolivia Banco Santa Cruz 90 1 1 336 1998 180
Chile Banco Santiago b 44 1 10 430 1991 294
Mexico Grupo Financiero Bital (includes
Banco Internacional de México) 8 4 10 000 37
Panama Centrobanco Hispano Panamá 100 ... ... ... ...
Paraguay Banco de Asunción b 85 5 151 1996 10
Peru Banco del Sur (Bancosur) b 90 5 1 042 1996 71
Puerto Rico BCH Internacional 100 ... 718 ...
Uruguay Eurobanco S.A. 100 ... ... 1996 8
Total 38 942 1 300
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from Grupo Santander (1999a), BCH (1999), Latin Trade (1998) and the financial
press.
a During 1998 a process of merging the different branches of the Banco Santander in Brazil was begun.
b The BCH group consolidated its presence in Latin America through its participation in the O’Higgins Central Hispano (OHCH) com-
pany. As from 1996, in coordination and joint management with the Chilean Luksic business group, it has carried on activities in
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru. At the end of 1998, the total assets of the banks forming part of the company came to some US$
12.8 billion, with US$ 1,233 million of own funds and a network of 276 offices with a staff of 7,511 persons. On 12 February 1999, the
BCH announced that it wished to put an end to its association with the Luksic Group in the OHCH company. The BCH valued the com-
pany at US$ 1.2 billion, of which the Spanish group was entitled to US$ 600 million. This valuation gave rise to conflicts, because when
it merged with the Banco Santander the BCH estimated its share of OHCH at some US$ 400 million. The Chilean group was given two
months to take a decision and finally accepted the US$ 600 million offered for its 50% share of OHCH.
come –by raising the efficiency of its Latin Ameri-
can subsidiaries– as the region recovers from the
effects of the international financial crisis and
growth and economic stability are restored.
Taking advantage of its experience in the Span-
ish market, the Banco Santander has carried out an
intensive campaign to introduce its corporate image,
promote its products which have been successful in
Spain –such as the SuperCuenta, SuperDepósito,
SuperHipoteca and SuperCrédito– and increase its
market share in the region. Like other banks which
have expanded in Latin America –the BBV and the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC)– the Banco Santander’s high-profile cam-
paign has forced other actors, both local and foreign,
to redefine their strategies and commitments, and it
has raised the level of competition in a sector which
is of crucial importance for the economic health and
stability of the region.
Parallel with the expansion of the Grupo
Santander, another smaller Spanish bank –the Banco
Central Hispano (BCH)– began its internationaliza-
tion in Latin America.7 The basic strategy of the BCH
in the region was to secure majority shares in local
institutions in association with strategic partners who
would take care of the local management of the oper-
ations. In 1996 the BCH embarked on an ambitious
process of expansion in the region which revolved
mainly around its strategic alliance with the Chilean
Luksic Group, through its share in the O’Higgins
Central Hispano company (OHCH). Thus, the BCH
was present in Argentina, Chile, Peru and Paraguay
in a 50/50 association with the Luksic Group. In its
operations in the region, a particularly important
place was occupied by its activities in Chile, where,
through the Banco Santiago, it was a leader in one of
the most competitive markets of the region (table 4).
As a result of financial difficulties and greater com-
petition in its market of origin, the BCH concentrated
its efforts on Spain and left the Luksic Group to run
the Latin American operations of the OHCH, which
incorporated institutions in Argentina and Peru. This
financial group thus came to control assets worth
some US$ 13 billion in the region (Sullivan, 1998).
After achieving a rapid recovery in Spain, the
BCH began to take a more active part in the OHCH
company, seeking to continue its expansion strategy
in the region with fresh resources. In March 1998,
in order to step up its growth in the region, the BCH
announced an increase of US$ 1,050 million in its
capital. Its Chilean associates were reluctant to par-
ticipate in new acquisitions, however, as they wanted
to concentrate their efforts on consolidating the
Banco Santiago. In view of the difficulty of finding
new partners,8 the BCH decided to continue increas-
ing its presence in the region on its own, acquiring
substantial packages of shares in the most important
banks of Argentina and Bolivia (table 4).
Early in 1999, the BCH merged with the Banco
Santander to create a new institution with a different
strategic orientation from that which the BCH had
previously been applying in Latin America. The top
executives of the group finally agreed that the main
strategic guidelines of the new institution should
give priority to strengthening retail, corporate and
business banking in Spain, increasing the contribu-
tion of the group’s international activities to profits
(with special emphasis on the European and Latin
American markets), and seeking the ongoing optimi-
zation of the group’s industrial holdings (BCH, 1999,
and Grupo Santander, 1999a). This meant, among
other things, the dissolution of the association with
the Chilean Luksic Group and the absorption of the
assets of the OHCH company by BSCH, which caused
some problems of overlapping in regional opera-
tions. The growth of the two groups’ operations in
Latin America has been crucial for their rise in status
among the largest banks in the world: thus, between
1997 and 1998 the Grupo Santander rose from 40th to
37th place and the BCH from 107th to 98th (The
Banker, 1999).
Like the BBVA, the Grupo Santander has not
concentrated exclusively on banking proper but has
also diversified into other financial activities such as
investment banking and pension fund management.
In this latter field (table 5), it is the leader in Spain
with 15.6% of the market, while in Latin America it
manages pension funds worth some US$ 6 billion
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7 At the end of 1998, the BCH was the third largest institution
on the Spanish banking market. Of this “Big Three”, it was the
least internationalized, having concentrated its efforts in this re-
spect in Latin America, which, in 1998, accounted for 13% of
its assets, 11% of its branches and 28% of its employees.
8 The BCH did not succeed in persuading the Banco Comercial
Português (BCP), its European associate, to join in its expan-
sion plans in Latin America. Indeed, the BCP has even tried to
dispose of its 8.5% share in the Banco Internacional: a share
which it acquired in association with the BCH, which has an
8.25% share in the Bital Group, the owners of the Mexican bank
in question.
in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, with
a total of over 4.3 million clients (Grupo Santander,
1999b).
In the mid-1990s the Grupo Santander opened
an office in New York with the aim of becoming one
of the three main investment banks for business deals
related to Latin America and thus complementing the
network of banks that it was beginning to establish in
the region. It quickly won the confidence of Latin
American companies and governments wishing to
gain access to international capital markets, but it
was not able to take advantage of its strong position
in the markets of the region to generate profitable
deals in New York (Moore, 1999). It performed well
in securities brokerage on secondary markets, despite
the low profit margins, but it only obtained rather un-
satisfactory results in more profitable operations
such as securities issues, going public, or mergers
and acquisitions. The Grupo Santander therefore de-
cided to reduce its presence in New York and con-
centrate on its local markets, concluding that there
was excess capacity in the field of Latin American
investment banking.
Finally, like the BBVA, the BSCH began to step
up its expansion process in Europe. At the end of
1999, the BSCH supported the Royal Bank of Scot-
land (in which it has a 10% share) in its US$ 40,689
million offer for the National Westminster Bank. If
this operation succeeded, the BSCH would obtain
6.5% of the new merged institution and would im-
prove its position in the United Kingdom finan-
cial market. In order to finance the operation, it
would increase its capital by 4.5%, to be offered
to some of its associates already referred to:
Société Générale, Commerzbank and San Paolo-IMI.
This would enable it to establish closer relations with
Société Générale, which would buy most of the new
shares and thus gain a seat on the board of directors
of BSCH (Expansión, 1999c).
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TABLE 5
Santander Central Hispano group: a
Presence in pension fund management in Latin America, 1999
Position in Total value of Number ofLocal company % ownership assets managed
memberslocal market (millions of dollars)
Argentina AFJP Orígenes 30 1 1 983 1 460 117
Chile AFP Summa Bansander 100 4 3 439 426 239
Mexico Afore Santander Mexicano 100 2 363 1 968 585
Afore Génesis b 100 12 30 141 542
Peru AFP Nueva Vida 80 5 163 127 338
Uruguay Santander AFAP 100 4 41 65 105
Total 6 019 4 188 926
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Grupo Santander (1999a).
a Like other Spanish banks, the BCH sought to diversify into other lines of business in the region, especially pension fund management.
With its traditional banking partners, it entered the pension fund management market in Chile (with the Luksic Group) and Mexico (with
the Banco Comercial Português), but it did not have a successful experience and in mid-1998 it liquidated its share in the Chilean pension
fund management company Qualitas.
b In July 1998 the Santander Group acquired Afore Génesis for US$ 27 million, subsequently merging it with Afore Santander.
IV
An expansion process not
devoid of difficulties
In 1998 and the first half of 1999, banking in Spain
operated in a dual environment. On the one hand, the
Spanish economy was performing satisfactorily, with
4% growth and the lowest interest rates in decades,
but on the other hand the worsening of the interna-
tional crisis due to the situation in Russia and Asia
hit the Latin American markets hard. Against this
background, the stock exchange value of the biggest
Spanish banks (the BBV and the Banco Santander)
deteriorated, and this adversely affected their opera-
tions in the region to some extent. Despite these ad-
verse conditions, however, both these institutions
closed the exercise with good results, attributable
above all to their performance in the first part of
1999. By the beginning of December 1998, both
banks had recovered and reported increases in profits
of 80% and 71% respectively (Durán, 1999). Indeed,
the high level of profitability of their Latin American
operations has enabled them to cover the cost of a
large part of their investments in the region. The top
executives of these Spanish financial groups have
continued to declare their commitment to expansion
in Latin America. Thus, they are expected to embark
on a second phase of this expansion strategy, de-
signed to increase the efficiency and competitiveness
of their banks in the region.
The stocks of the BBV and the Banco Santander
fell by almost 50% between July and September
1998 (figure 3), and the risk rating agencies lowered
their forecasts for these banks because of their
over-exposure in Latin America. In spite of the
strong reaction of the markets, however, these Span-
ish institutions were apparently prepared for even
worse situations (Calderón and Casilda, 1999). In
their Latin American banks they maintained an aver-
age level of provisions against unpaid loans of over
100%, although in fact the rate of delinquency was
quite low: at the end of 1998 the percentage of over-
due loans in the region was 5.6% for the BBV and
3.7% for the Banco Santander. In mid-1998 they also
put into effect stringent programmes of sound man-
agement and reduction of costs.
In addition to the reactions of the market, these
operations also had their critics inside Spain. The
growing importance of the Latin American opera-
tions of the country’s two main banks gave rise to
concern, mainly because of the vulnerability that the
economies of the region have shown to upsets on in-
ternational financial markets. Thus, the Banco de
España considered that the two institutions’ Latin
American acquisitions involved considerable risks,
much greater than those deriving from traditional
banking operations, and even urged the main Spanish
banking institutions to make a very careful evalua-
tion when purchasing new assets and to lay stress on
their quality rather than seeking short-term gains.
At the same time, the impending entry into ef-
fect of the Euro on 1 January 1999 further height-
ened the competitive pressures on the Spanish
banking institutions. Consequently, as they needed to
make adjustments in their global strategy, the possi-
bility of mergers between Spanish banks or with
some European partner became more likely.
Thus, on 15 January 1999 the Banco Santander
merged with the BCH to form a new institution called
the Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH). This
new bank became the leader in the Spanish market
and one of the most important banks at the European
level, and its position in the face of future alliances
in the Euro zone was considerably strengthened. Af-
ter this agreement, the BSCH became the biggest for-
eign financial group in Latin America, leaving the
BBV in second place and displacing other long-estab-
lished banks in the region, such as the United States
institutions Citibank and BankBoston and the Dutch
bank ABN Amro. At the same time, the merger tran-
quillized the markets and the stock market value of
the new Spanish group began to register a rapid and
lasting recovery (figure 3).
According to the financial press, one of the main
losers in all this was the BBV, and it was expected to
react to these developments. Finally, on 19 October
1999, after nine months of continual rumours, the
BBV and Argentaria merged to form a new institu-
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tion: the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA).
With this operation, the Spanish banking system was
consolidated around two great institutions, although
the BSCH continues to be the leader: in the area of
loans it has around 20% of the market, compared
with the BBVS’s 17%, while in terms of deposits each
institution has around 15% of the market (Expansión,
1999a). The BBVA also became a very important ac-
tor at the European level, with a market capital level
slightly above that of the BSCH.
Although the merger complemented and
strengthened the new bank’s presence in Latin
America, it also gave rise to some difficulties: basi-
cally, it increased the level of banking concentration
and revealed some shortcomings in the regulatory
frameworks of the markets in which these institu-
tions already operate or expect to operate in the fu-
ture. Thus, in some countries of the region the
economic authorities are taking a hard look at the
dominant position that the two Spanish banks have
acquired (figure 4). If it is considered that the degree
of concentration affects or harms free competition,
they may be obliged to divest themselves of some as-
sets. In markets such as Argentina, Chile and Vene-
zuela, the BBVA has achieved a bigger share than it
has in Spain: indeed, this bank and the BSCH have be-
come the only two banks in the world which have
achieved such a position outside their natural market
(Calderón and Casilda, 1999).
The most serious problem created by the estab-
lishment of the BSCH is in Chile, where the Banco
Santiago and the Banco Santander Chile occupy the
first and second places at the national level, with a
joint market share of nearly one-third (28% of the
system’s loans), which may be against the
anti-monopoly regulations. This case revealed the
shortcomings of the national regulatory frameworks
for coping with an increasingly globalized interna-
tional market. At the end of April 1999, the BSCH fi-
nally dissolved its alliance with the Luksic Group,
which it paid US$ 600 million for its 50% share of
the joint activities in Latin America. With this opera-
tion, the BSCH controlled 44% of the Banco Santiago
and 86% of the Banco Santander Chile; it also came
to an agreement with the Central Bank of Chile
to acquire over three years the 34.5% share that the
latter had in the Banco Santiago. Furthermore, the
Banco de España does not find it very acceptable
that a Spanish bank, which it is responsible for su-
pervising, indirectly has 30% of its banking risks in
Chile or another foreign country, for this means that
any upset affecting the banking market of the host
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FIGURE 3
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and Banco Santander:
Evolution of share prices, 1995-1999
(In pesetas)
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the Madrid Stock Exchange.
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country can affect that bank and, ultimately, the
Spanish banking system too.
In these circumstances, the BSCH came to an
agreement with the Chilean government and parlia-
mentary authorities in which it undertook to run the
two banks it owns in the country separately (the
Banco Santiago and the Banco Santander Chile) and
to put off a possible merger of the two. It also agreed
to reduce its share in the Chilean market, so that its
decision as to which of the banks it intends to sell is
awaited. This is a complicated matter, as these are
banks worth a great deal of money (US$ 1.8 billion
for the Banco Santiago and US$ 1.3 billion for the
Banco Santander Chile), but it is nevertheless ex-
pected that this sale will take place in the short term.
Analysts wager that it will opt for strengthening the
Banco Santander and carving up the Banco Santiago
for subsequent resale. This operation would include
the transfer from the Banco Santiago to the Banco
Santander of the whole of its 100% compatible port-
folio (which should amount to about 8% of the
whole), in order to raise the latter bank’s market
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FIGURE 4
Banco Santander Central Hispano and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya:
Presence in Latin America, 1999 a
BBVA BSCH
branches branches
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Calderón and Casilda, 1999.
a Numbers in brackets indicate position in the national banking system.
share by a similar amount. Among possible purchas-
ers would be Citibank and ABN Amro, with the pos-
sibility that the BSCH might sell the Banco Santiago
to its strongest competitor, the BBV, being almost
completely ruled out. Finally, in January 2000 the
BSCH announced its decision to reduce its participa-
tion in the Chilean market. According to some spec-
ulations in the press, the BSCH is preparing to merge
the two banking institutions, which would mean an
immediate reduction of four points (El Mercurio,
2000).
In the case of the merger between the BBV and
Argentaria, the situation has been somewhat differ-
ent (figure 4). This union would not give rise to any
major problems in Latin America, because of the al-
most total lack of any overlapping of the two Span-
ish financial groups’ operations in the region. The
BBV has concentrated on commercial banking and,
more recently, on pension fund management. Right
from the start, Argentaria was unwilling to invest
large amounts of resources in the purchase of other
banks, so it opted for a line of business which it
knew very well and did not involve many risks: pri-
vate pension fund management.
For the Latin American countries it would be
desirable –quite apart from the problems of bank
concentration– that this massive entry of foreign
banks, and especially of Spanish institutions, should
further the achievement of various objectives, in-
cluding the following:
– Strengthening the local financial systems
through the greater capacity of the foreign banks
to obtain resources at lower cost on international
markets.
– Reducing intermediation spreads through the in-
crease in competition and the fact that the for-
eign banks are accustomed to working at lower
profit margins (3% in the United States and the
United Kingdom, compared with 6.3% in Brazil,
for example). If there were such a reduction, the
financial costs of borrowers would also be re-
duced.
– Increasing competition and reducing operating
costs, which would oblige the local banks to
raise their efficiency in order to reduce their vul-
nerability.
– Increasing the level of financial intermediation
through a greater supply of new and more so-
phisticated products from the institutions operat-
ing in local markets.
So far, the most obvious result has been the
strengthening of local markets, which, in the face of
two large-scale international financial crises (in late
1994 and mid-1997), have shown themselves to be
less vulnerable than in past crises (especially the ex-
ternal debt crisis). Perhaps the most difficult case
continues to be that of Mexico. With regard to the
benefits of increased competition and their transfer
on to clients, the results have been varied. In general,
the intermediation spreads of foreign banks in their
Latin American operations continue to be high, un-
like the spreads in their markets of origin, and al-
though operating costs have been sharply reduced
the cost of credit has not gone down significantly.
To sum up, in a setting which has undergone
many changes the internationalization strategy of the
main Spanish banks has given rise to heated contro-
versy. In Latin America, Spain and the European Un-
ion, the political and economic authorities, businessmen,
shareholders, markets and clients have all expressed
their different points of view about the unprecedent-
edly rapid and far-reaching phenomenon of the ex-
pansion of the Spanish banks in the main areas of
business of the Latin American financial sector.
V
Conclusions
After more than ten years of a broad-ranging and ex-
tensive process of liberalization and financial dereg-
ulation, the situation in the Latin American banking,
insurance and pension fund markets has been com-
pletely changed by the massive presence of global fi-
nancial institutions. The great Spanish banks have
been central actors in this process and have become
leaders in most of the countries and segments of fi-
nancial business in the region (figure 4). In the early
1990s, these banks, together with some public enter-
prises such as Telefónica and Iberia, led the process
of internationalization of Spanish business. Now, the
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Spanish banks come to Latin America for their own
interests rather than those of their clients, and the
Spanish public enterprises which are most active in
the region have been totally privatized.
The international financial crisis which began in
1997 and its strong impact on the region –particu-
larly in Brazil– did not alter this trend, for the inter-
national banks continued to increase their presence
in the markets of the region (figure 4). Firstly, many
of the small and medium-sized banks in Latin Amer-
ica have not been able to adapt to the new situation,
which could mean their disappearance or acquisition
by foreign companies, and secondly, some of the
larger institutions have sought the financial support
of important foreign companies in order to be better
prepared for the expected increase in competition in
the years to come.
In general terms, the first stage in the expansion
of the big Spanish financial institutions in Latin
America is now over. In the main line of business,
commercial banking, the BBVA and the BSCH both
occupy similar positions, with a strong presence in
most of the markets of the region. The main unfin-
ished business for them is their expansion in the Bra-
zilian market and, to a lesser extent, that of Mexico.
They have also embarked on an active process of di-
versification, combining investments in banking with
others in insurance, in pension funds, and more re-
cently in private health systems.
The strong impact that the growing exposure of
the main Spanish banks in Latin America has had on
their stock market value has forced them to make
some adjustments in their internationalization strat-
egy. In Latin America, in view of both the reduction
in profit margins due to the stronger competition and
the more marked relative external vulnerability of
those markets, they have had to apply active
programmes to put their branches in the region on a
sounder footing and improve their productivity, and
in Europe, as a result of the increase in average sizes
and in competitive pressures, the Spanish banks ap-
pear to be embarking on an expansion strategy which
will put them in a better position to cope with future
developments in this common market.
From the Latin American standpoint, the entry
of foreign banks, and especially of the Spanish insti-
tutions, has helped to stimulate and modernize the fi-
nancial systems of the region. In general, the foreign
institutions have introduced new instruments and
technology, have increased the levels of competition
–with direct effects on the availability and cost of
credit– and have made the local financial systems
stronger and more stable. They have also brought
some difficulties, however, such as the increase in
concentration and the slowness with which the bene-
fits of the greater competition and efficiency of the
Latin American financial markets have been passed
on to clients.
This broad presence of the Spanish banks, to-
gether with the active expansion of Spanish
non-financial enterprises in the main Latin American
markets, has caught the attention of regional and
multilateral agencies, and at the same time it has
shown up the limitations of national regulatory
frameworks for coping with the increasing globaliza-
tion of international markets. Thus, decisions taken
in Europe affect users in Latin America and else-
where, giving rise to reactions at various levels
whose final results have yet to be seen.
(Original: Spanish)
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